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I N T R OD U C T ION

THE DIVERGENCE OF THEORY, REALITY, AND MORALITY
In popular imagination, criminal justice is a morality play, a form of educational social theater. As Thurman Arnold put it, “Trials are like the miracle or morality plays of ancient times. They dramatically present the
conflicting moral values of a community in a way that could not be done by
logical formalization.” When values conflict, trials help to air and reconcile them; even when the values are settled, as they often are, trials teach
and reinforce them. “In its very detail and drama . . . the trial becomes a
morality play which impresses upon the public that the law is being
enforced and that justice is being fairly administered.” Crime thrillers,
movies, and television portray courtroom dramas culminating in jury
trials. In some, falsely accused defendants speak their piece and clear their
names publicly. In others, victims have their days in court, literally see
justice done, and sometimes even receive apologies from those who have
wronged them. The jury serves as the chorus of a Greek tragedy, “the conscience of the community.”1 It applies the community’s moral code, pronounces judgment, and brands or exonerates the defendant. Jury trials
sort out who did what, what retribution (payback) wrongdoers deserve,
and how to denounce crimes and vindicate victims. Ordinary citizens are
key players, as victims and defendants have their say and jurors and the
public sit in individualized judgment. They suffer, they make amends, and
sometimes they even apologize or heal. Viewers evaluate who was right
and wrong, empathize with the protagonists, and await catharsis and resolution by the end of the show.
Law students think they know better. The vision of criminal justice
taught in most law schools emphasizes adversarial combat between prosecutors and defense lawyers at trial. On this account, lawyers duke it out over
the facts and the law, and their combat separates the innocent from the
guilty. Prosecutors seek to maximize convictions and punishment, to deter
(scare off ) and incapacitate (lock up) as many wrongdoers as possible.
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Defense lawyers seek the opposite, to get their clients acquitted or at least
the lowest possible sentence. They insist on procedural fairness and rights,
questioning whether there is proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Victims
are largely absent from this picture, defendants are pushed to invoke
their rights to remain silent, and jurors meekly follow judges’ technical
instructions. Instead, lawyers run the show.
Newly minted lawyers soon find that the reality in the criminal justice
trenches differs from both of these pictures. Unlike the popular imagination, the real world does not have much use for laymen. Victims rarely get
to say much in court, certainly not at crucial proceedings such as bail,
charging, and plea bargaining. Defendants stay silent, letting their lawyers do the talking for them. Discussions of right and wrong, of pain and
blame, are almost absent. There is rarely a morality play. Punishment is
largely hidden in far-away prisons, out of sight and out of mind.
Nor do new lawyers find much glamorous trial-lawyer combat in the
real world. Indeed, plea bargaining is the name of the game. Many criminal lawyers assume that nearly everyone in the system is guilty and
so negotiate settlements instead of fighting it out. Cookie-cutter plea
bargains struck in conference calls or hallway conversations resolve most
cases, so jurors and the public see few of them. These mass-produced bargains short-circuit elaborate constitutional procedures such as discovery,
cross-examination, and jury instructions and deliberation. Lawyers trade
defendants’ constitutional rights, such as Miranda warnings and searchwarrant requirements, as plea-bargaining chips for lower sentences. Some
relevant factors, such as the badness of the crime and the defendant and
the strength of the evidence, do influence plea bargains. But so do irrelevant factors such as the prosecutor’s and defense lawyer’s salaries and
caseloads and the defendant’s ability to afford bail. In other words, lawyers seldom seem to vindicate the innocent, vindicate the Constitution,
weigh wrongdoers’ just deserts, reform defendants, or heal victims. About
all they do is move the plea-bargaining machinery as quickly and cheaply
as possible, which maximizes the number of people the system can deter
and incapacitate. The machinery of criminal justice, and its need for speed,
has taken on a life of its own far removed from what many people expect
or want. Efficiency has all but killed the morality play the public craves.
How did this happen in a democracy? After all, most criminal cases are
titled something like People of the State of X vs. John Q. Defendant.
Prosecutors still prosecute cases in the name of The People, and the public
is passionately interested in them. How, then, did the criminal justice
system become so far removed from The People, who are nominally
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in charge? How did it become so amoral, hidden, and insulated? And is
there anything we can or should do about it?
To some extent, this distance between voters’ interests and public officials’ actions pervades representative government. Insiders’ control of
government is a chronic source of friction in a democracy, but the problem
is most acute in criminal justice. In other areas of government, rational
apathy and faith in expertise leads voters to defer to experts about, say,
regulating fungicides or pension plans.2 (No one would bother to watch
reality television about tax auditors or dramas about public housing.) In
contrast, many ordinary citizens do not defer to criminal justice experts
but show passionate interest in how insiders handle criminal cases. Indeed,
public outrage flares when politicians or the media sporadically bring
perceived injustices to light.
In addition, the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution guarantees local,
public jury trials. In other words, the public has a constitutional right to
know about and take part in criminal trials, though in practice plea bargaining subverts those rights. The stakes are high as well: defendants’
lives, liberties, and reputations compete with victims’ rights, the public’s
security, and the law’s expressive and moral messages. Also, crime victims,
bystanders, and ordinary citizens have few procedural and no substantive
legal rights in criminal justice. Judges, police, and prosecutors are not
constrained by identifiable clients in the ways that, for example, teachers
and welfare case workers are.3 Thus, both the need for and the limits on
democratic participation are particularly acute in the criminal arena.
Many scholars have written histories of plea bargaining, but that is not
my precise focus here. As chapters II and III discuss, plea bargaining is
part of a larger series of trends that have professionalized and mechanized
the criminal justice system so much that it is out of touch with ordinary
people’s expectations and desires. Various explanations for these trends
are partly true but incomplete. For example, some blame the Warren
Court’s creation and expansion of defendants’ constitutional rights.4 These
rights ranged from Miranda warnings, to exclusion of evidence seized
without search warrants, to habeas corpus petitions challenging final
criminal convictions. These technicalities are often far removed from
guilt, so factual guilt and innocence matter somewhat less to cases’ outcomes. And these new rights gave prosecutors additional incentives to plea
bargain, in exchange for defendants’ surrendering of their rights. The
plea-bargaining machinery, however, long predates the 1950s, and prosecutors were the ones who created it. These new defense rights created new
bargaining chips and fueled prosecutors’ incentives to bargain; these
rights may have accelerated the machinery but did not start it.
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Others lay the blame at the feet of rising crime and increased caseloads.5
There is truth to this explanation as well. As courts became busier, they
struggled to find faster ways to dispose of their business. Plea bargaining
circumvented increasingly formal trials, allowing courts to move more
criminal and civil cases. This partial explanation, however, leaves lawyers
out of the picture. If victims and defendants were still handling their own
cases amidst today’s caseloads, they would not plea bargain in the same
way that prosecutors and defense counsel do. Lawyers’ outlooks, interests,
and lack of accountability to laymen are integral to the mechanical
mentality. Rising caseloads do not capture these factors.
Today, many people reflexively view this history as progress, as criminal justice moved from the bloody dark ages of our past to the more rational, enlightened present. The increases in lawyers, procedures, and plea
bargaining have indisputably brought some benefits: they have increased
some safeguards and accommodated staggering caseloads. Without denying these benefits, I want to critique these transformations and expose
their overlooked costs. When one takes a few steps back to reflect on these
developments, they appear far more troubling and costly. We cannot
simply wax nostalgic for a bygone era, as the plea-bargaining machinery is
not about to disappear, but we must see the past and present landscape
clearly. Criminal justice used to be individualized, moral, transparent,
and participatory but has become impersonal, amoral, hidden, and insulated from the people. It has thus lost some of its popular democratic legitimacy and support. Appreciating what we have lost can inspire reforms
to revive these classic values in the modern justice system. Defendants,
victims, and communities can play larger roles through grand juries, consultation with prosecutors, rights to be heard in court, restorative justice
conferences, and requiring defendants to work to support their families
and victims.
The ideal of the individualized morality play and personal confrontation lives on in our culture, waiting to be revived in practice. That does not
mean we should or even can abolish plea bargaining and lawyers’ leading
role in criminal justice; they bring some benefits and are here to stay. But
it does mean that we can attack the machinery’s excesses. Th at means
giving outsiders more information, more voice, and more influence, reintroducing key aspects of the redemptive morality play. Instead of remaining outsiders, victims, defendants, and ordinary citizens should actively
participate as stakeholders alongside insiders.

OV ERVIEW OF T HE BO OK

Chapter I of this book retells the history of the criminal justice machine.
Colonial Americans saw criminal justice as a morality play. Victims initiated and often prosecuted their own cases pro se (without lawyers), and
defendants often defended themselves pro se. Laymen from the neighborhood sat in judgment as jurors, and even many judges lacked legal training. Trials were very quick, common-sense moral arguments, as victims
told their stories and defendants responded without legalese. Communities were small, so gossip flew quickly, informing neighbors of what was
going on. Even punishment was a public affair, with gallows and stocks in
the town square. True, punishments could be brutal, procedural safeguards were absent, and race, sex, and class biases all clouded the picture.
Nonetheless, the colonists had one important asset that we have lost:
members of the local community actively participated and literally saw
justice done.
Various forces changed this picture. Lawyers’ dominance rose hand in
hand with caseloads. Judges developed technical rules of evidence, boilerplate jury instructions, and procedure in tandem with the lawyers who
were equipped to handle them. Lawyers are agents who are supposed to
serve their principals: prosecutors are supposed to represent the public’s
and victims’ interests in justice, while defense lawyers are supposed to
represent defendants’ interests. But lawyers had and still have strong selfinterests in disposing of cases to lighten their own workloads and to avoid
risky trials, and they tend to focus on quantifiable benefits.6
The rise of lawyers not only excluded victims, silenced defendants, and
bypassed jurors through plea bargaining; it also hid criminal justice outside open court, just as prisons hid punishment behind high walls. Thus
the system became not only less participatory, but also less transparent.
Professionals greased the plea-bargaining machinery, speeding it up by
bypassing laymen. In the process, the lawyers promoted case-processing
efficiency and let the morality-play aspect wither. Laymen who encounter
criminal justice for the first time see a yawning gulf between their popular
xix
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expectation of justice and the lawyerized reality of amoral, cookie-cutter
plea bargaining.
The point here is not to romanticize the past, to suggest that it binds us,
or to advocate bringing back whipping or lynch mobs. But it helps to know
where we have come from, if only to understand why we have expectations
that our justice system does not satisfy. This historical account also illumines some of the forces that continue to shape our system to this day, so
that we can critique it and consider possible reforms.
Some readers may wish to skip the historical overview and begin
directly with the problems as they stand today, in chapter II. That chapter
addresses the gulf between criminal justice insiders and outsiders. The
insiders are the judges, prosecutors, defense counsel, police, and probation and parole officers who dominate criminal justice day to day. They are
knowledgeable, powerful repeat players with distinctive senses of justice.
They value disposing of cases efficiently over the means used to reach that
result. The insiders can predict what that result will be, so they can strike
bargains that reflect those expectations and save everyone time and
money. Speedy bargains make all the insiders happy: prosecutors, defense
lawyers, and judges all lighten their own workloads and move on to the
next case. Insiders, then, see little reason to go through the motions of
courtroom ritual just to reach predictable convictions and sentences. Nor
do they see much need to include outsiders; as they see it, they themselves
are professionals who know best how to run criminal justice to serve
outsiders’ interests.
Outsiders, in contrast, are laymen, not lawyers: victims, members of
the public, and even to an extent defendants. To them, criminal justice
seems opaque, technical, and amoral. Most of what they know is from sensational news anecdotes and glamorous crime dramas, which are far
removed from the humdrum plea bargaining of open-and-shut smaller
cases. They have few ways to participate in criminal cases. Finally, outsiders lack insiders’ self-interests in clearing their dockets, and they do not
grow jaded or mellow. Their dominant concern is to do justice.
To outsiders, doing justice does not mean infl icting the greatest punishment on the greatest possible number of defendants. While the public
is often misinformed about average sentences, when properly informed it
often finds actual sentences sufficient or even excessive. One cannot
assume that current laws are harsh because that is what the public really
wants; these laws often result from a warped, dysfunctional political
process. Distortions arise in part because frustrated outsiders vent their
dissatisfaction in the abstract by clamoring for more toughness in wholesale-level reforms. When they are given concrete cases, however, average
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citizens favor sentences as low as or even markedly lower than those
required by a variety of criminal laws. A number of empirical studies by
Julian Roberts, Paul Robinson, and others, discussed in chapter II.A.2,
confirm this striking finding. At the individual, retail level, outsiders’
judgments are far more nuanced and less harsh overall. Unfortunately,
now that outsiders rarely serve on juries but instead influence legislation
and referenda, the abstract, wholesale perspective has largely supplanted
the contextualized, retail one. In addition to substantively just convictions and sentences, outsiders also want to see defendants held publicly
accountable through fair, participatory procedures.
These differences in information, participation, and values create an
enduring tension between self-interested insiders and excluded outsiders.
The result is a game of tug-of-war. Insiders manipulate substantive rules
and low-visibility procedures to dispose of cases as they like. Outsiders try
to constrain insiders by changing substantive policy, say by creating new
crimes and sentences. Insiders then subvert these constraints procedurally, and so on. Because insiders are better informed and continually
involved, outsiders find it hard to win enduring victories but are periodically provoked to rise up in outrage.
This tug-of-war hurts criminal justice in many ways. It provokes voters
to enact simplistic, crude laws. It makes it hard for outsiders to monitor
insiders’ performance. Insiders are thus too free to follow their own
desires instead of victims’ and the public’s interests, which subverts
democracy. The problem is particularly acute for insiders who are insulated from the decisions they make: a federal prosecutor or judge who
commutes from the suburbs does not live with or hear from urban victims
or defendants’ families. The gulf between insiders and outsiders can cloud
criminal law’s efficacy, making the law too unclear to deter and condemn
crimes effectively. It hinders criminal justice’s ability to vindicate, heal,
and provide catharsis to victims and the public. And it can sap public faith
and trust in the law, making citizens less willing to follow the law.
There are also significant gaps between defense lawyers and their
clients. Insider defense lawyers have strong interests in getting along with
prosecutors and judges and disposing of their huge caseloads, particularly
because most are overworked and underfunded. Defendants are overoptimistic, in denial, and prone to take risks. Huge differences in education,
language, class, race, and sex impede communication. Defendants distrust
their appointed lawyers because they are not paying for them. Defense
lawyers do all the talking, effectively silencing and disempowering their
clients. Lawyers see it as their job to minimize punishment and dispose
of cases, but in doing so they can overlook clients’ needs to express
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themselves, apologize, and heal. No political tug-of-war erupts, as defendants have little political or economic power, but these huge differences
impair representation, oversight, and trust.
Chapter III focuses on one of the most serious failings of mechanical
criminal justice: its failure to vindicate and heal. The professionals who
run the machinery see their job as dispensing impersonal punishment,
not sending moral messages or healing wounded relationships. The swiftness of the plea-bargaining machinery disposes of large caseloads quickly
and cheaply, but at the expense of many other criminal justice values. Plea
bargains and sentences reflect the individual defendant’s badness, as well
as the lawyers’ interests, abilities, and workloads. At best, the question is
how much retribution, deterrence, and incapacitation this defendant
needs. While these factors are relevant, they are static, overlooking the
dynamic potential of criminal justice to transform those who take part.
Criminal justice could not only reduce future crimes, but also restore the
relationships ruptured by crime. Currently, however, it largely ignores
these goals.
In particular, criminal procedure enables defendants to remain in
denial and does almost nothing to cultivate their expressions of remorse
and apologies and victims’ forgiveness. A criminal defendant who is in
denial about his guilt may still be able to plead guilty and receive a guiltyplea discount; at most he need admit guilt only grudgingly. These equivocal guilty pleas deprive defendants, their families, victims, and the public
of clear resolutions. They leave defendants in denial and more likely to
repeat their crimes, and deprive victims of vindication. In contrast, jury
trials and unequivocal guilty pleas vindicate victims, denounce crimes,
and teach lessons. Defendants who remain in denial need jury trials to
condemn or exonerate them, driving home clear messages to defendants,
victims, and the public.
Criminal procedure has the same blind spot for expressions of remorse
and apology. Crime is about more than just individual wrongdoing; it
harms social relationships. Criminal procedure uses remorse and apology
merely as poor gauges of how much retribution, deterrence, and incapacitation individual defendants need. But these tools have great power to
heal wounded relationships, vindicate victims, and educate and reintegrate wrongdoers into the community.
Likewise, forgiveness used to play a much larger role in criminal procedure. But today, the state and its professionals dominate criminal procedure and largely exclude outsiders. They leave little room for outsiders
such as victims and defendants to tell their stories, grieve, apologize, and
forgive.
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Part of the problem is that insiders’ individual-badness model sees
defendants as separate from the web of relationships and communities
they have wounded. Another problem is that criminal procedure ignores
many of the substantive justifications for punishment, such as educating
defendants and the public and vindicating victims. In law school, we teach
criminal law and criminal procedure as completely separate fields, but of
course procedure exists to serve and implement substance. Criminal procedure needs to take more seriously the many values underlying the substantive criminal law, which it is supposed to serve. Right now, it does
little more than minimize cost and maximize speed, incapacitation, and
perhaps deterrence. Those aims are indeed substantively valuable, but
procedure overlooks many other substantive values.
Chapter IV considers correcting these defects by adding new and different lay voices to criminal justice. The state’s monopoly on criminal justice
blinds it to the valuable human interests and needs that outsiders have.
Crimes harm not just an impersonal state, but real people—people who
deserve more consideration and power in criminal procedure. Mediation
and other face-to-face interactions between victims and wrongdoers offer
this hope. The state deserves a role and is useful in tempering vengeance
and ensuring equality. But state control should not squeeze out the human
needs and voices of real victims, defendants, and the public. Each ought to
be able to have a say. That does not mean giving victims vetoes; neutral
judges and juries must retain the final say. Victims and members of the
public could check prosecutors at least by expressing their views.
Empowering victims need not license vengeance. Victims care much less
about controlling outcomes than about being heard and having a role in
fair processes.
My suggestions for an individualized, participatory criminal justice
system bear some resemblance to three recent criminal justice movements: victims’ rights, restorative justice, and therapeutic jurisprudence.
Each of these movements has valuable insights but offers only a part of
the morality play for which the public thirsts. First, the victims’ rights
movement restores a crucial focus on the needs of victims, who often get
lost in lawyer-dominated criminal procedure brought in the name of the
state. Some victim advocates rightly emphasize the need to treat victims
respectfully and hear their voices. But much of what passes for victims’
rights rhetoric is unbalanced and vengeful, a cloak for law-and-order
toughness. It often suggests that the only way to make victims happier is
to punish defendants more, even though victims often care more about
respectful treatment and apologies. Second, restorative justice emphasizes mediation to let victims, defendants, and their families confront and
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talk with one another. The idea of transcending a one-dimensional, zerosum struggle between prosecutor and defense counsel is attractive, and
participants seem to come away more satisfied. The difficulty is that most
restorative justice enthusiasts, such as John Braithwaite, leave too little
role for the state, blame, or punishment. Finally, the therapeutic jurisprudence movement rightly focuses on how the legal system’s procedures can
serve as (or obstruct) emotional and psychological therapy for wrongdoers, victims, and others. On the other hand, the rhetoric of therapy and
psychology has a clinical ring, eschewing blame in favor of treatment.
Here, as with restorative justice, the reluctance to blame and speak moral
language leaves therapeutic jurisprudence incomplete.
All this moralistic talk may leave many readers uneasy. Our pluralistic
society comprises a wide range of religious and moral beliefs, so we are
uncomfortable engaging in morality-speak. It seems safer instead to rely
on neutral criteria such as speed, cost, and numbers of cases processed.
Lawyers can then run the system to maximize efficiency, obscuring the
thorny moral judgments that are better suited to juries.
Chapter V addresses criminal procedure’s embrace of efficiency as the
antidote to moralizing. Criminal procedure tries to maximize efficiency,
but lawyers rarely consider what it is supposed to be doing so efficiently.
Criminal justice, more than almost any other area of law, is morally
freighted in the popular imagination, and its moral significance is linked
closely to its legitimacy. While controlling crime is one important concern
of both insiders and outsiders, outsiders also want much more. They expect
the criminal law to vindicate the innocent defendant or the wronged
victim and denounce the guilty.
Why, then, is legal discourse about criminal procedure so divorced from
popular moral discourse about the same subject? Some of the blame rests
upon the artificial academic separation of criminal procedure from substantive criminal law. Some rests upon insiders’ bureaucratic outlook and
emphasis on quantity, speed, and cost. More of the blame, though, stems
from intellectuals’ fear that moral judgments are at best contentious, at
worst arbitrary and intolerant. In contrast, the scientific language of efficiency and deterrence appears objective and indisputable. Academics and
lawyers also fear that popular moralizing will be harsh and merciless;
some prefer to trust their own sense of mercy and kindness.
Notwithstanding academic skepticism, however, Americans share a
healthy enough moral consensus on the basic issues of criminal justice to
support robust moral appeals and discourse, as chapter V.B shows. First,
empirical research by Paul Robinson and others shows that laymen’s
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judgments about crime emphasize retribution and show remarkable
consensus in ascribing and ranking blame. The moral consensus about
when and how much to blame is strongest for crimes against persons and
property, but there is also substantial agreement even about so-called
victimless and morals offenses. Second, when discussing hot-button topics
such as the death penalty, laymen think it more polite to invoke neutral
deterrence-speak than contentious moral language. What really drives
their views, however, are expressive moral judgments about crime. Third,
laymen bring these moral expectations to criminal procedure. They care
not only whether legal procedures reach the right outcomes, but also
whether they are fair and legitimate and whether they give laymen enough
voice and control. They expect to have their say and their day in court, to
be able to blame, grieve, and perhaps apologize and forgive. The machinery
ignores these expectations. Fourth, laymen are not nearly as harsh as lawyers assume. Popular moral discourse accommodates both justice and
mercy, punishment and forgiveness.
Taking these considerations more seriously, and bringing them out
into the open, should enhance citizens’ perceptions of the justice system’s
legitimacy without leading to excessive confl ict over values. Fear of conflict over values should not lead us to squelch moral discourse, driving it
underground into coded references and vigilantism. On the contrary,
healthy moral discourse can strengthen, refine, and reinforce the community’s moral code and expectations. Taking these ideas seriously, however,
would require substantial reforms to the machinery of criminal justice.
Readers who are already convinced that the system is broken and out of
touch may wish to skip ahead to the final chapter, which discusses how to
solve these problems. Chapter VI begins to consider how one could return
power to laymen within a lawyer-driven system. We cannot dynamite the
entire machine and go back to lay-run criminal justice. The American
criminal justice system could not handle its staggering caseloads that way,
and the cost of sacrificing all procedural rights and expertise would be
intolerable. But it is worth thinking seriously about how laymen could
play more substantial and active roles in criminal justice.
First of all, punishment could be more visible, more focused on making
amends, and better at reintegrating convicts after they have paid their
debts to society. All able bodied inmates should have to work to repay victims, the state, and their own families. Work, perhaps even in the military
or a civilian corps, would be prosocial, offsetting wrongdoers’ antisocial
crimes and teaching good habits. Likewise, mandatory educational and
vocational training and drug treatment would teach valuable skills and
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help them to reintegrate as law-abiding citizens after release. Relaxing the
collateral consequences of convictions would likewise promote inmates’
reentry into society.
Alas, the macro-level reforms just suggested would collide head on with
institutional barriers. Military leaders would resist admitting large numbers of poorly skilled convicts with disciplinary problems, and unions and
businesses would oppose having to compete against prison labor. In the
face of these entrenched barriers, the prospects for a national top-down
fi x are dim. Moreover, the problem is too diverse for a single national fi x.
No one statute or Supreme Court decision, or even a sequential reform
program, will fi x our broken system from above. Rather, we need bottomup populism to pursue a multi-faceted approach. Reform is more likely to
happen at the mid-level of counties, cities, and neighborhoods, and the
micro-level of individual criminal cases. A variety of outsider pressures,
organized and amplified through social-networking technology, can marshal
outsiders’ voices and their desire to participate at the retail level.
In criminal proceedings, defendants could be offered greater speaking
roles, instead of having their defense counsel say everything while they
remain mute. The system might encourage them to speak more, particularly after they plead guilty, when they need not worry about self-incrimination. Plea colloquies, sentencing hearings, and victim-offender
mediation conferences before or after sentencing could offer defendants
more opportunities to listen and speak. They could make public apologies
and could pay back their families and victims through mandatory work.
Having been held publicly accountable and paid their debts, defendants
would be ready to be reintegrated rather than permanently shunned.
Victims too could play larger roles. From investigation onwards, police
and prosecutors could use automated computer systems to notify victims
of arrests, bail status and hearings, charges, plea discussions and bargains,
and sentencings. Victims could have rights to consult with prosecutors
throughout investigations and prosecutions. They could also have the
option of greater speaking roles at these court hearings and in face-to-face
conferences with defendants. Restorative procedures are possible, though
imperfect, ways to give victims and defendants greater voices.
Even members of the public could receive better information and
broader rights to consult with prosecutors and police, both in individual
cases and through community-policing and -prosecution forums. And
new restorative sentencing juries could blend restoration, retribution, and
expressive condemnation. Victims and defendants would speak, prosecutors would justify their plea bargains, and juries would ultimately decide
what sentences and discounts were deserved. That would radically change
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current law. Prosecutors could no longer bargain over the crime charged or
over the facts. A plea bargain could recommend a lower sentence, but first
a prosecutor would have to persuade a community jury that the punishment fit the crime. Thus, plea bargains would no longer be raw exercises of
prosecutorial power, but persuasive public justifications ratified by juries.
Empowering victims could shift enforcement priorities toward violent
and property crimes and away from so-called victimless crimes, except
when particular indirect victims are aggrieved and complain. For example, drug enforcement might focus more on neighborhoods where gunfire,
disorder, and other spillover effects harm the community. Police and prosecutors should not be completely beholden to victims, especially when
they ask for disproportionate harshness or leniency. One does not want to
give domestic abusers the power to get charges dropped by intimidating
their victims into submission. But law-enforcement officials should heed
and give more weight to victims’ concerns.
These solutions, of course, carry costs. Including more parties will slow
down proceedings, cost more, and reduce the volume of criminal cases
that the system can process. In other words, reforms may reduce the
aggregate amount of retribution, deterrence, and incapacitation that the
system can mete out. But sometimes it is worth sacrificing quantity for
quality. Some defendants or victims might receive better treatment than
others, particularly those who are white, female, articulate, well-educated,
and well-off. Greater personalization risks reducing formal equality and
neutrality, which raises fears of bias. Many defendants will seek to game
the system, feigning remorse and apology to win sentencing discounts.
Yet many of these problems already exist in the status quo, and bringing
them out into the open is likely to alleviate them. And one can at least
hope that these short-term costs would be justified by the long-term
benefits of restoring communities and ultimately bringing down crime.

T H E ME S OF T H E B O OK

The overview exposes deep fault lines within criminal justice. Several
themes recur in the account above. One pervasive theme is the divide
between lawyers and laymen. Because lawyers tend to write the accounts
of the legal system, they sometimes overlook this gulf, or else attribute it
to the ignorance of non-lawyers. They trust themselves as the guardians
of the rule of law and suspect public input as antithetical to law, equality,
and reasoned moral judgment. From their internal point of view, which
emphasizes quantity and results, they see themselves as doing as much
justice as the system can handle.
But the insider-outsider gulf is too deep and too serious to dismiss so
quickly. Insiders take for granted their own knowledge and power, forgetting that their dominance of the system is a relatively recent development.
Thus, proposals for public disclosure seem to intrude upon sacred prosecutorial secrecy. Victims’ rights seem like newfangled threats to lawyers’
turf, instead of a re-empowerment to serve deeply felt needs once again.
Likewise, insiders can overlook their self-interests. They are agents of
principals, namely their clients or constituents. Yet insiders may not feel
much pressure to conform to outsiders’ expressed desires or interests
because outsiders have so little power. There is no effective feedback
loop nor check on agents’ behavior. And because they are insulated from
outsiders, insiders may not appreciate that their utilitarian emphasis
on efficiency conflicts with outsiders’ expressive, moralistic interests. Or
insiders may dismiss outsiders’ moralism as benighted and crude, instead
of grappling seriously with outsiders’ interests in quality and not just
quantity. Outsiders are not irrational in seeking procedural justice in addition to substantive outcomes. They care about increasing the number of
defendants punished, but they also care about the message expressed by
the process. Nor are they wrong to think that their input can enrich dry
legal processes. They understandably want to see justice done and take
part in it, rather than taking insiders’ word for it. The ailment of criminal
justice is not excessive populism per se, as many scholars argue,7 but
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insiders’ excessive agency costs and outsiders’ lack of healthy outlets,
especially in individual cases.
As a matter of political theory, insiders ought to heed and hear the
outsiders for whom they supposedly work. Insiders must not simply foist
on the public their sense of efficiency, or crime control, or justice. In
a democracy, outsiders’ sense of justice must be central to both the substance and the process of criminal justice. For substantive criminal law,
that means respecting what Paul Robinson calls empirical desert, the
liability and punishment intuitions that most community members share
upon reflection. The analogue in criminal procedure is procedural justice,
the public’s sense that procedures must treat people fairly and with respect
and should give them a voice. Tom Tyler and other scholars explore what
the public expects procedural justice to look like.8 As chapter II explains,
the reality has drifted far from the public’s sense of procedural and substantive justice. It needs to be brought back into line. Thus, this book’s
normative argument is primarily populist and democratic. It advocates
criminal procedures that reflect the enduring moral intuitions of the
electorate, rather than some abstract philosophical theory. The pendulum
should swing away from the rationalism, centralization, and statism that
have come to dominate criminal justice since Cesare Beccaria wrote more
than two centuries ago. Criminal justice insiders are fundamentally
Weberian bureaucrats, but my emphasis is Tocquevillean.
A second theme of the book is the divorce between the values of criminal procedure and the values of substantive criminal law. Procedure is
supposed to serve substance. But instead of weighing many substantive
justifications for punishment, procedure emphasizes largely procedural
values. For nearly half a century, criminal procedure scholars have debated
within the famous dichotomy of procedural models sketched out by
Herbert Packer. In Packer’s scheme, the (softer) Due Process Model stresses
fairness, rights, defendant autonomy, and accuracy in freeing the innocent. The (law-and-order) Crime Control Model emphasizes accuracy in
convicting the guilty, speed, cost, finality, and efficiency.9 Both ends of
Packer’s spectrum slight the substantive reasons why we punish and the
roles victims and communities should play in criminal justice.
I do not want to overstate my case. Speeding up the machinery will
maximize total years of imprisonment, thus promoting crime control
through incapacitation and deterrence. And accuracy, emphasized by the
Due Process Model, is essential to deter, incapacitate, and inflict retribution on the right people. Nevertheless, these substantive values are hardly
overt, and other important substantive values drop out entirely. In practice, efficiency serves only the handful of values that are easy to quantify,
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like incapacitation. Missing is much discussion of retribution, vindicating
victims, educating the public, or reconciling and healing defendants,
victims, and communities. In other words, criminal procedure is largely
divorced from the sibling it is supposed to serve, namely substantive
criminal law. Our procedures maximize the quantity of output and slight
the quality of the process and its softer goals.
Moreover, as Packer acknowledges, both models assume that the adversary clash of lawyers is central. Both thus implicitly buy into the insider
world-view. Both also seem to treat criminal justice as a tug-of-war, a
zero-sum contest between conservatives and liberals, prosecutors and
defense counsel. Of course there is a zero-sum aspect: victims want some
punishment, and defendants would prefer not to suffer it. But, I hope to
show, there are changes that could make both sides better off, as victims,
defendants, and communities often need to heal together. Sometimes this
aspiration will prove too idealistic, but in other situations it can work.
This healing aspiration relates to a third theme of the book: a move
from the individual-badness model to a more relational approach to crime.
In gauging punishment, recent criminal procedure focuses on the individual defendant’s badness: how much deterrence and incapacitation does
he need? It draws a mechanistic picture of deterrence as pain and incapacitation as physical constraint. This approach is not so much wrong as
incomplete. It ignores the other substantive-criminal-law values discussed
above. Deterrence is not simply about pain and threat, but about reinforcing social norms and communicating public messages that discourage
crime in other ways.
Equally, the individual-badness focus ignores the relational aspect of
crime. Crime is not simply a discrete violation, a physical or monetary
injury. It wounds relationships. Very often, wrongdoers, victims, and
neighbors know one another, and crime estranges and embitters them.
Even stranger-on-stranger and some victimless crimes tear the social
fabric, sowing fear and distrust in neighborhoods and communities. In
many situations, criminal justice has the potential to heal these wounded
relationships, at least if the parties are willing to talk. Sometimes wrongdoers will admit guilt, accept blame, profess remorse, apologize, and make
amends. Sometimes victims are willing or eager to tell their stories, vent,
listen, accept apologies, and forgive, particularly if they see justice done.
In other cases, all we can do is deter and incapacitate wrongdoers and
inflict punishment. But in the right cases, criminal procedure can do more,
helping to vindicate and heal the parties and their wounded relationships.
*****
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A note on terminology: Because public opinion and popular morality
are central to my argument, I have tried to make the book accessible to
non-lawyers and non-academics, writing as simply and clearly as possible.
For instance, I explain concepts, terms, and ideas that will already be
familiar to criminal procedure scholars, legal historians, and other lawyers and academics. I have consolidated my references down to one endnote per paragraph and minimized internal cross-references in order to
limit distractions for the ordinary reader. I have also striven to use popular terminology where it is equally precise. For example, most criminal
justice scholars habitually refer to offenders, perhaps because that word
has a clinical, amoral ring. But a key part of my argument is that insiders’
reluctance to speak the language of moral blame has distanced criminal
justice from the lifeblood of popular moral judgment. I sometimes use the
term offender to track the language of one of my sources, or in terms of art
such as sex offender, repeat offender, first offender, and victim-offender
mediation. Occasionally I use the term criminal, defendant, or inmate,
where I want to stress the link to a crime or to one’s status in a criminal
case or prison. But for the most part I deliberately use the term wrongdoer, because it highlights the moral and legal wrong that the criminal
justice system must try to heal. Academics’ fl ight from the stigma attached
to that term, I argue in this book, has backfired, breeding public dissatisfaction. The solution is to bring moral judgment out into the open instead
of trying to squelch it.

